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It is widely accepted that embodiment is crucial for any self-aware agent. What is less obvious is whether the body has to be real, or whether a virtual body will do. In that case the notion of embodiment would be so attenuated as to be almost indistinguishable from disembodiment.
In this article I concentrate on the notion of embodiment in human agents. Could we be disembodied, having no real body, as brains-in-a-vat with only a virtual body? Thought experiments alone will not suffice to answer this Cartesian question. I will draw on both philosophical arguments and empirical data on phantom phenomena.
My argument will proceed in three steps. Firstly I will show that phantom phenomena provide a prima facie argument that real embodiment is not necessary for a human being. Secondly I will give a philosophical argument that real movement must precede the intention to move and to act. Agents must at least have had real bodies once. Empirical data seems to bear this out. Finally, however, I will show that a small number of aplasic phantom phenomena undermines this last argument. Most people must have had a real body. But for some people a partly virtual, unreal, phantom body seems to suffice. Yet though there is thus no knockdown argument that we could not be brains-in-a-vat, we still have good reasons to suppose that embodiment must be real, and not virtual. 





Embodied, embedded cognition seems to be the new orthodoxy in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Agents are seen as embodied and interactively situated in worlds. There is, however, no consensus about the precise definition of the notions of agent, embodiment and embeddedness. Agents may be human beings, other kinds of animals, robots, virtual entities or pieces of software. In their article ‘The Self as an Embedded Agent’ (2003) Dobbyn and Stuart try to elucidate the various ideas of agency, situatedness and embodiment. They start, quoting me, from the idea that
 
The agent behaves intentionally within its world, expressing a thought relation between itself as subject and some object, and, it is argued that from this “interplay between purposive action and changing environment” (Meijsing 2000, p. 47) a sense of self evolves. (Dobbyn and Stuart 2003, 187).

They then go on to define a self-aware agent in terms of embeddedness, which in its turn is defined in six points, together constituting the minimal conditions for self-awareness. Though the first point of their definition reads that “the animat must be situated and embodied” (ib., 192), they later claim that a virtual organism could count as being situated and embodied.​[1]​  Real bodies and real worlds are not necessary.
	In this paper I propose to address the notion of embodiment in connection with ourselves. Are we, human beings, essentially embodied and what kind of embodiment is involved here? We are self-aware agents if anything is. I have argued that “that which we are immediately aware of in self-consciousness is … essentially a corporeal, spatial thing as much as it is a conscious thing” (Meijsing 2000, 49). Here I want to examine Dobbyn and Stuart’s Cartesian challenge to this claim: such a ‘corporeal, spatial thing’ might be virtual instead of real. They discuss a brain-in-a-vat and state that:

… impulses across the efferent actuating channel could be intercepted and fed into the computer model, feeding back into altered stimulation of the afferent channels to denote movement within, or change to, the world. To all intents and purposes, the unfortunate brain has a body – there is no way that the brain could tell it had not – but this body is not extended in physical space, only in virtual space (ib., 196).

Now of course there is a sense in which this is undeniable. If we were all brains-in-a-vat, and absolutely everything were as if our brains had a body, a virtual body would be as good as a real one. In that case none of us could tell whether we were brains-in-a-vat. But that kind of virtual reality is not really interesting because, “to all intents and purposes”, there would be no difference between the virtual world and the real world. Wondering about an evil demon would be an idle sceptical exercise. Even the story of The Matrix, where there is a virtual world, would not get off the ground if no one knew there was a difference.​[2]​ It would be quite another situation if there were just one (or a few) brains-in-a-vat with virtual bodies among a population of embodied people. In that case the embodied ones would know there was a difference, and so would the brains-in-a-vat. Their social world would be hugely different from that of their embodied friends and relatives, unless they were kept by a truly evil scientist who creates a complete virtual world for them. The question is, however, if any scientist could create such a world. I won’t go into the question whether the creation of a complete virtual world is possible. I will restrict myself to the possibility of a virtual body. No doubt there are all kinds of extremely important social implications of having a virtual body, but I will not go into those either.​[3]​
In order to answer the challenge that virtual bodies will do for embodiment, one must look at a more interesting, and somehow more ‘real’ notion of virtuality. After all, the whole idea of virtual reality is to get away with less than the real world, not to mimic absolutely everything in the real world. The interesting question is which aspects of reality are essential and which are superfluous.
	The standard reaction to the brains-in-a-vat idea is that it may be possible in principle, but that it is unfeasible in practice. Thus Dobbyn and Stuart write:

There are, of course, good pragmatic reasons for favouring the physical world as a situation for animats. We argued above that an animat’s situation is required to be complex; in principle, such complexity can be simulated, but in practice it is a very difficult endeavour, requiring a massive programming effort (ib., 196).

Similarly, Daniel Dennett reassures us that: 

The problem of calculating the proper feedback, generating or composing it, and then presenting it to you in real time is going to be computationally intractable on even the fastest computer … the evil scientists will be swamped by combinatorial explosion …One conclusion we can draw from this is that we are not brains in vats … in case you were worried (Dennett 1991, 5; 7).

Brains-in-a-vat are just as much a fiction as The Matrix is; the whole idea is a thought experiment, leaving technical and practical problems aside. It is just because these problems are ignored that such thought experiments are ever deemed to be convincing. In order to spell out in any detail what information to feed to the brain, we cannot simply rely on intuition.
In the real world – as opposed to the world of fiction or fantasy – real people sometimes really experience body-parts that are not there. Phantom phenomena are the real-world approximations of virtual bodies. I want to examine the implications of phantom phenomena for the claim that embodiment does not require a real body, that less than the real body will do for being a self-aware agent.


2. The varieties of phantom phenomena

We sense the condition of our body, and its posture and movement, continually from within, as it were. This process is termed proprioception.​[4]​ Although proprioception is sometimes called the sixth sense, it isn’t really one specific sense that is served by one organ. There are various internal information systems involved: receptors for pressure and temperature, for posture and movement, for balance, for hunger and for fatigue (Bermúdez et al. 1995, 13). Afferent nerves feed this information from the periphery to the brain. Indeed much of this information is processed unconsciously, and thus not really sensed at all. 
	After losing a limb or other body part, subjects often report that it feels as if the missing part is still present - apparently in the absence of proprioceptive feedback from that part. This phenomenon was first described in 1551 by the French physician Ambroise Paré (Lott 1986, 244n3), and termed ‘phantom limb’ by the American neurologist and war-surgeon S. Weir Mitchell (1864; 1872).
Phantom limbs have popularly been associated with pain, but apart from painful phantom limbs there are also non-painful ones (Melzack and Wall 1988). Non-painful phantom limbs are felt as tingling or numb, as heavy, as hot or cold or as swollen or tight. But quite often they are simply felt as being there, as an integral part of the body, without any specific sensation (Hunter et al. 2003).
There are many individual differences in the experience of phantom limbs, and also within individuals there is a variety of phenomena. Phantoms are rarely experienced as just continuously there; they often come and go. This is unlike normal limbs, which you also are not continuously aware of, but which are nevertheless always felt as being ‘there’. Katz gives a list of excerpts from interviews with amputees, showing 

how dynamic and fluid the phantom limb experience can be, consisting of frequently changing perceptual experiences that depend upon current sensory input, the emotional state and past experience of the individual amputee (Katz 2000, 46).
 
Phantom phenomena are not restricted to amputees. According to Melzack & Wall  (1988) the older literature states that children born without limbs do not experience phantom limbs. But Weinstein and Sersen (1961) mentioned cases of phantom limbs in subjects with congenitally absent limbs and more cases have been reported since (Saadah & Melzack 1994; Ramachandran & Blakeslee 1998; Wilkins et al. 1998). Nor does the limb in question have to be actually missing: subjects who have had local anaesthesia in a limb regularly have non-painful phantom sensations. Although they do not receive any feedback from their arm or leg, they still experience it as ‘being there’, although often not in the place, or the posture, they see it in. They may see their legs as being stretched out in the bed, yet feel them as being bent (Dirksen et al. 2000; Paqueron et al. 2003).
	About two-thirds of the subjects with phantom limbs can move them at will, for instance in trying to take hold of something. Ramachandran and Blakeslee mention a case of someone who reached with his phantom arm for a cup. When the cup was pulled away, he cried out in pain, because his phantom fingers had just taken hold of the ear (Ramachandran & Blakeslee 1998,  64). 


3 Phantoms and disembodiment

When the French philosopher Descartes argued in the 17th century for the self as res cogitans, phantom phenomena were already known. According to Descartes we need not be embodied at all. We are essentially a thinking thing: res cogitans. We are intimately connected with our bodies. But the body, extended in physical space, res extensa, is not essentially a part of us. 
In the present context of embodied embedded cognition, Cartesianism is seen as the worst kind of armchair philosophy. Descartes couldn’t be more wrong in his exclusion of the body from the self. Yet it is interesting to see that Descartes does not solely rely on intuitions for his claim. He also uses empirical data on phantom phenomena in his argument. He says:

[I]n an infinitude of other cases I found error in judgements founded on the external senses. And not only in those founded on the external senses, but even in those founded on the internal as well; for is there anything more intimate or more internal than pain? And yet I have learned from some persons whose arms or legs have been cut off, that they sometimes seemed to feel pain in the part which had been amputated, which made me think that I could not be quite certain that it was a certain member which pained me, even although I felt pain in it (Descartes Meditation VI; HR I, 189).

So even the internal sense, proprioception, cannot be used as an argument that we are embodied in the sense of having a real body. The content of proprioception is intrinsically spatial (Brewer 1995; Bermúdez 1998): it is not, for instance, a pure, non-spatial sensation of pain that is somehow inferred to originate in the finger, it is a pain-in-the-finger. The spatial location is part of the feeling from the outset, and we have an immediate inclination to act towards that particular location. Not, however, towards a particular location in objective space, but rather towards a location that is primarily a part of the body.​[5]​ But this very spatiality can be wrong, as phantom phenomena show. If anything, it is the sensational part of proprioceptive content that is perhaps incorrigible, but the spatial part is certainly fallible. So it seems as though we cannot use proprioception in an argument for real embodiment.
Descartes discusses the case of a girl with a phantom arm:

She had various pains, sometimes in one of the fingers of the hand which was cut off, and sometimes in another. This could clearly only happen because the nerves which previously had been carried all the way from the brain to the hand, and afterwards terminated in the arm near the elbow, were there affected in the same way as it was their function to be stimulated for the purpose of impressing on the mind residing in the brain the sensation of pain in this and that finger (Descartes Principles IV, 196; HRI, 293-294).

This kind of explanation is known as the bell-rope account. When a certain bell rings on the bell-board in the butler’s pantry, it is a sign that someone rang in the library. But that same bell will ring when the connecting rope is pulled anywhere on its way from the library to the pantry. So a prankster could fool the butler into thinking that he is wanted in the library, by pulling the rope somewhere else. 
The bell-rope account of phantom phenomena is still very influential today.​[6]​ It is also exactly the kind of theory that leaves room for the idea of brains-in-a-vat. Stimulation of the afferent nerve causes a brain process that leads to (or is) the sensation of pain in the finger, no matter where that nerve terminates on the peripheral end. So that nerve itself can be arbitrarily short; it need not originate in any real finger. Descartes speaks of 

a certain movement [of the brain] which nature has established in order to cause the mind to be affected by a sensation of pain represented as existing in the [finger] (Descartes Meditation VI; HR1, 197).

This idea of specific movements of the brain can be seen as the forerunner of the notion of a cortical map of the body. The evil demon can mimic this movement of the brain in the absence of any afferent nerve, and the poor deluded Cartesian mind will just go on thinking it has a pain in the finger. The materialist evil scientist can directly stimulate the cortical map, and the poor isolated brain-in-a-vat will just go on thinking it has a pain in the finger. We might all be in this predicament, fooled all of the time. That is, we might not be embodied at all. Phantom phenomena can be used in an argument against real embodiment. Virtual bodies would do as well.​[7]​ It seems as if Dobbyn and Stuart find themselves in sympathy with Descartes on this point - though it is Descartes, and not they, who uses empirical arguments here!


4 What brains-in-a-vat cannot do

Now let us take a closer look at the details of Dobbyn and Stuart’s brain-in-a-vat example. What is it that the evil scientist feeds the brain? 

Now it is easy to construct a thought experiment in which a brain is disembodied in some nutrient bath and its afferent neural channels, sensory and proprioceptive, are given appropriate analogue stimuli, the process being controlled by a computer model of a 3-D world. More elaborately, impulses across the efferent actuating channel could be intercepted and fed into the computer model, feeding back into altered stimulation of the afferent channels to denote movement within, or change to, the world. To all intents and purposes, the unfortunate brain has a body – there is no way that the brain could tell it had not – but this body is not extended in physical space, only in virtual space (Dobbyn and Stuart 2003, 195-196).

It is crucial to analyse what exactly is happening here. What is involved in the computer model of the 3-D world? Presumably this model contains both the ‘outside world’ and the body: it has to feed both the sensory and the proprioceptive afferent channels. It is remarkable in this kind of thought experiment that neural signals are deemed to give all the necessary information. Humoral signals, for instance, are never even mentioned.​[8]​ 
The next question is what kind of interaction is involved. “More elaborately”, the authors say, the model itself has to be fed with the signals from the efferent channels. The model then computes the changes in the body and in the world that would result from the efferent signals, and feeds these changes back into the sensory and proprioceptive channels.
But in fact the brain also makes its own predictions about the expected changes in sensory and proprioceptive information through an internal feed forward model. When sending a command to the motor cortex, an efference copy of the command is sent to the cerebellum, where the effects of the command are modelled (Blakemore, Wolpert & Frith 2000; Grush 2004). The centrally predicted effects are normally compared with the actual feedback from the periphery. This would make the brain somewhat less dependent on the computer model. 
All this seems to suggest that the model reacts to the brain, and that the brain has to give these signals to its efferent channels of its own accord. It is not the computer model that makes up these efferent signals. It is crucial in this thought experiment to take the time into account. Where do the first signals start, in the model or in the brain? Which side is reacting, which is initiating things? And do we have to see this process synchronically or diachronically?
Suppose you are such a brain-in-a-vat. To all intents and purposes, you have a body, even if it is only a virtual body extended in virtual space. So you might think: “Here I am, sitting at my desk, reading an article about brains-in-a-vat. Lucky me - I’m not one. I can get up and walk around any time I like”.​[9]​ Is this really possible?
Can you even think the simple self-reflexive thought, “Here I am, sitting at my desk…”? Presumably this is the brain’s spontaneous thought; it does not belong to the stimulation of the computer model. The model can only send sensory and proprioceptive information. But where do the very concepts come from, not only the concept of a desk, but of ‘sitting’ and of ‘I’? Is the brain able to construct them solely on the basis of the sensory information it gets at that moment?
Back in the time of the Wiener Kreis, the phenomenalist program tried to translate all concepts into a combination of sensation terms and logical connections.​[10]​ But it is generally acknowledged that the program could not succeed: such a translation cannot be given.​[11]​ There is no way of building concepts out of sensations alone. It has even been argued that all of our basic concepts – of agency, causality, space, self – are grounded in the primitive experience of our own body.​[12]​ Most philosophers opt for externalism these days: “meanings just ain’t in the head” (Putnam 1975, 227).​[13]​ A brain on its own cannot have meaningful internal states, and it cannot construct them on the basis of sensory information synchronically.
	But perhaps it could learn those meaningful internal states over time, diachronically. However, the next part of your thought is even more problematic. Suppose you did have those concepts and your brain did have meaningful internal states. Could you then really decide to get up and walk around? We already know you could not really get up and walk, but could you, the brain-in-a-vat, at least try or intend to do it? If you could, you would send motor signals down your efferent channels, and the computer model would then feed back the appropriate signals denoting change in the external world up your afferent channels. 
In order to get up you must move your leg in a certain way. Call the intention to move your leg a basic intention (Hurley 1998, 256). Basic intentions are intentions that you cannot act on by acting on another intention.

You may intentionally (frighten off the burglar by turning the light on). And you may intentionally (flip the switch by moving your finger). But at some points your intentions run out: you do not intentionally (move your finger by moving a neuron), under normal conditions (Ib., 357). 

Now we can ask: could your brain have the basic intention to move your (its?) leg? Could it know what it was trying to do? How would it know what the content of its basic intention was? The more global intention to get up might be clear - if we grant that you have a range of normal concepts. But the basic intention, the executive part of the plan, would be left completely open. It would be as if a general, intending to win the war, issued the order to use plan B, but wouldn’t have the faintest idea what plan B amounted to. 
The question is this: can we try to do something if we have never had any external feedback that we had succeeded in doing it? Take, for instance, biofeedback. You get the instruction to relax your frontal muscle, the large vertical muscle in the middle of your forehead. So your global intention is to do just that, but still you haven’t the faintest idea what it is you are supposed to do. You may pull some faces or try to look as blank as possible, but even then you have no idea whether you have succeeded in what you were instructed to do. You know, from proprioception, that you have pulled those faces or looked blank. But you still don’t know whether you have relaxed that particular muscle. Yet it is under voluntary control, because when the tone of that muscle is recorded with an electrode, and rendered visible as a signal on a screen, you can very quickly learn to reduce it, simply by reducing the amplitude of the signal. So now, with the help of this external feedback, you know what you were supposed to do. Linking the external feedback with the proprioceptive feedback you know: this is what I must do. It may be quite difficult to keep the exact nature of ‘this’ in mind in the absence of the external feedback, but with training it gets easier.
Once you have felt, proprioceptively, what it is you are supposed to do, or rather, what it was you did when you succeeded, you know what your basic intention is. This fact is being used in physiotherapy, where the therapist moves the limb of a paralytic patient in order to give her the feel of the movement she is supposed to make. Our detailed intentions to move, our basic intentions, are without external or peripheral feedback of success not only futile, they are empty. The problem is not so much that we do not succeed; we do not know what we are trying to do. As the philosopher Carlos Moya puts it:

… trying to move follows the natural ability to move, and not vice versa. Someone who is paralytic from birth cannot try to move. He simply does not know how to try, because he lacks the ability to move (Moya 1990, 27).​[14]​

If the foregoing is correct, it would imply that, if you had no real legs, you simply couldn’t try to move a leg that you never had, because you have never experienced an external criterion of success. Not only is it the case that conceptual meaning ain’t in the head, basic intentions ain’t in the head either. Real movements precede basic intentions.​[15]​ Movement lies at the very origin of our existence. The development of locomotion precedes the development of the cerebral cortex, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically.  Movement precedes both thinking and intending. The brain, sitting passively in its vat, could never have any intentions to act. It couldn’t be an agent.
	One might object that, over time, we might make the brain an agent. If the computer model were to begin by feeding it proprioceptive information about its own virtual body, from involuntary or passive movements, as of an infant, the whole process would start with virtual movement, and in due time the brain would develop intentions to move. But now we are back at the uninteresting notion of virtual reality. If the brain were to get absolutely everything as if it had a real, moving body, it would not notice the difference. A virtual body would do. But as we do not even know what absolutely everything amounts to – there is certainly more involved than just the afferent neural channels – this amounts to the Cartesian claim involving an omniscient evil demon. This sceptical claim is unanswerable, but perhaps not very interesting.
	In order to be an agent, a brain has to have a history of a moving body. It may be an as-if body if ‘as-if’ is taken in the above ‘absolutely everything as-if´ sense. But nothing less than the real thing would do.


5. How to move a phantom limb

Empirical evidence on phantom phenomena seems to bear out the foregoing argument. There are subjects who can intend to move limbs that they do not have. They can intentionally move their phantom limb and experience its moving. This may seem to support the claim that they don’t need a real body, as Descartes thought. But more detailed analyses of empirical data show that matters are more complicated. Once one considers these subjects’ history, it looks as if they at least must have had a real body once.
	Normally, when you have the basic intention to move your leg in a certain way, some motor program is set in action. An efferent signal is sent to the muscles of the leg, and the movement is executed. An efference copy of the signal is sent to the cerebellum, where the movement is emulated. You often see your leg move, which forms a kind of documentation of the movement. At the same time, you get afferent signals to the brain from proprioception that also document the movement. So even with your eyes closed you know your intention to move your leg has succeeded. Normally we have this triple documentation and feedback system for our movements. We sense our own movements.
	It is instructive to make a distinction between a sense of ownership and a sense of agency of our movements.​[16]​ Visual and proprioceptive feedback accounts for a sense of ownership: “I see and feel my leg move”. Obviously, something more is needed for a sense of agency, for: “I feel that I move my leg”. Afferent signals do not suffice. Strangely enough, a causally efficacious efferent signal does not suffice either. Neuroscientist Wilder Penfield describes the reactions of his anaesthetised patients under brain stimulation:

When I have caused a conscious patient to move his hand by applying an electrode to the motor cortex of one hemisphere, I have often asked him about it. Invariably his response was: ‘I didn’t do that. You did’. When I caused him to vocalize, he said: ‘I didn’t make that sound. You pulled it out of me’ (Penfield 1975, 76).

Here both afferent (proprioceptive) and efferent signals are present. The patient feels his hand move, has a sense of ownership, but not of agency. Proprioception accounts for the sense of ownership of movement, but it is not yet quite clear what does account for the sense of agency. Presumably there must be a prior intention to move, and therefore specific pre-movement brain activity.​[17]​
	Now let us look at subjects with phantom sensations and awareness. These subjects have no visual feedback for movements. They can see that their arm or leg is missing. Yet they often sense their phantom limb and even sometimes feel it move. V.S. Ramachandran has tried to manipulate the visual feedback of phantom limb subjects, and the results are amazing. He worked with subjects with one real arm and one phantom arm. These subjects could not move their phantom arm. Indeed they were greatly bothered by this experienced immobility. They desperately wanted to move their phantom arm, intended to move it, but simply couldn’t. Ramachandran put them in front of a mirror. Thus he gave them the visual feedback that they had two real arms. When given the instruction to move both arms symmetrically, they saw two arms move symmetrically: the real arm and the mirror image of the real arm. But they also felt both their arms move symmetrically: the real arm and the phantom arm. The visual feedback overruled their normal feeling that the phantom arm didn’t move, couldn’t move. But as soon as they closed their eyes, the felt movement stopped (Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1998, 68-71).
	It is not quite clear whether these subjects just felt their arm move, or whether they felt that they themselves moved it. If they relied only on the visual feedback, it would be no more than a documentation of the movement. Of course the same thing goes for people who rely on genuine proprioceptive feedback: here too the feedback amounts to a documentation of movement. Proprioceptive feedback gives the sense of ownership: I feel my arm move. 
One might claim that, when grounded in genuine proprioceptive feedback, the sense of ownership is immune to error – this in contrast with visual feedback, which can generate all kinds of error as to whose arm is moving. There is no question that it is my arm that moves in the genuine proprioception case. But the subjects in Ramachandran’s experiments not only thought or inferred from the visual feedback that their arm moved, they really felt it move. Yet this happened in the absence of proprioceptive feedback. Moreover, there are also cases of experienced or felt movement of phantom limbs without visual feedback. Even worse, visual feedback indicates in these cases that there is no limb, hence no movement. And in these cases there is no other peripheral feedback, as again there is no limb, hence no periphery. Can one even speak of proprioceptive feedback from a limb if the limb in question doesn’t exist?
Phantom limbs aren’t always immobile. Ramachandran’s subjects needed the mirror to be tricked into experiencing movement. But many subjects experience involuntary movements spontaneously. And indeed quite a few subjects claim that they can move their phantom limbs at will. They experience sensations of reaching out to grab something or of moving their fingers voluntarily. They need neither visual feedback, nor any feedback from proprioception in the periphery – they have no periphery. The sensation of movement must therefore arise centrally, probably through what is called efference copying. When a motor command is sent from the motor cortex to the muscles in the periphery, a copy of this command is sent to the cerebellum and to the parietal lobe of the cortex, telling the brain, as it were: “This is what the body is doing”. The cerebellum then computes the expected sensory and proprioceptive feedback. Phenomenally, the effect of this may be that the intended movement is felt even in the absence of actual proprioceptive feedback. Even if there is no body to follow the motor command, the brain may still think that the body has done what it was commanded to do. It is as if an overconfident general was sure, without checking on the field, that his commands were obeyed as soon as they were given, because the commands were filed in his office. Efference copying is one way in which the body schema is updated. But normally there is also a peripheral check (proprioception) and often an external check (visual feedback) that the intended movements were indeed performed.​[18]​
These subjects of phantom sensations have both a sense of ownership and a sense of agency of their movement. Both of these senses must be accounted for by central processes, as they currently do not have any peripheral or external feedback of movement, or indeed a real moving limb. So the sense of ownership has to arise centrally in these cases, as a result of efference copying. And the sense of agency must arise centrally, as a result of at least the original efferent command. So proprioception is not necessary for a sense of ownership and agency of a body. One can sometimes experience at least parts of the body, and experience them as one’s own, without the existence of those body parts, hence without the existence of proprioception from those parts. Real body parts are not necessary, or so it seems.


6. The brains of subjects with phantom sensations and awareness

For how can a brain intend any movement and experience that the intended movement has just been executed, in the absence of a moving body? If, as I have argued before, real movement precedes intending and acting, a brain without a body just could not intend any movement, let alone experience it. The literature on phantom phenomena largely bears out the claim that real movement precedes intended and experienced movement. Subjects of phantom sensations have a history: they usually had real limbs once, but they lost them through amputation or accident. 
The nature and quality of phantom phenomena are often correlated with the situation of the limb in question at the time of amputation or loss. Phantoms are more vivid, and persist longer, after traumatic limb loss, or following amputation of a previously very painful limb, than after a planned surgical amputation of a non-painful limb (Katz and Melzack 1990; Ramachandran and Hirstein 1998).​[19]​ Indeed the phantom limb often occupies a habitual posture, the one it had just prior to amputation.​[20]​ Even much more detailed memories are retained in the phantom limb: subjects sometimes continue to feel a wedding ring or a watchband on the phantom (Ramachandran and Hirstein 1998). Ramachandran and Hirstein also describe the following case:

… one of our patients reported that, before amputation, the arthritic joint pains in her fingers would often flare up when the weather was damp and cold. Remarkably, whenever the air became humid the same pains would recur in her phantom fingers. Also, when her hand went into a clenching spasm in the evening, the thumb was usually … ‘sticking out’ …but on the occasions when it was flexed into the palm, the spasm was accompanied by the distinct feeling of her thumbnail digging into the pad of the fifth digit. The curious implication of this observation is that even fleeting sensory associations may be permanently recorded in the brain (Ib., 1607).

In the light of these findings it looks as if phantom phenomena are a question of memory traces: after amputation there is no limb and accordingly no proprioception from that limb. Memory traces of the situation just prior to the amputation linger on, no longer contradicted or damped by fresh proprioceptive feedback. This would account for the fact that a phantom limb so often stays frozen in its habitual posture, haunted by its remembered pain.
	That would mean that real proprioception from a real limb has to precede the experience of phantom limbs, otherwise there would not be any memory traces. So phantom limbs cannot support the view that we are really just our brains after all. The brain must have had real limbs once. Real limbs are necessary, at least historically. In the light of this evidence virtual limbs will not do.


7. Congenital limb-deficient subjects

Alas, this is not the whole story. As I said, the literature on phantom phenomena largely bears out the claim that real movement precedes intended and experienced movement. Subjects of phantom sensations usually had real limbs once. But not all of them.
	In line with the previous argument, the older literature states that children born without limbs do not experience phantom limbs. Prolonged sensory input from a limb was held to be necessary for the formation of the cortical representation of the limb, which is presumed to underlie the body schema and the experience of the phantom (Simmel 1958). Also children with amputations before the age of five were thought not to experience phantoms (Lott 1986). But such complacency is no longer possible. Weinstein and Sersen (1961) mentioned cases of phantom limbs in subjects with congenitally absent limbs and more cases have been reported since.​[21]​
	These findings have been ignored or criticised for some time because children were supposed to be highly suggestible and therefore unreliable subjects.​[22]​ But Saadah and Melzack (1994) present four cases of adults with congenital limb deficiencies. Three of them felt phantoms for the first time as adults. The authors conclude that:

… despite the neural changes that are known to occur after deafferentation, a portion of the neural representation of the body in the brain persists into adulthood – even in those who are congenitally limb-deficient – to permit a phantom limb to be experienced (Saadah and Melzack 1994, 480).

To make matters even more complicated, some of these congenital limb-deficient subjects can move their phantoms at will. Weinstein, Sersen and Vetter (1964) report that 7 of their subjects with congenitally missing limbs were able to voluntarily move their phantom. One might suggest that in these cases there was only one limb missing and the experienced movement was a crossover effect of the experience of real movements of the corresponding real limb. However, Poeck (1964) describes the case of an 11-year old girl who was born with congenital absence of both forearms and hands. She reported distinct phantom hands. She was able to move her fingers and, like other children her age, she used her fingers to solve arithmetic problems. Also Ramachandran and Hirstein (1998) mention a young woman with congenitally missing arms who could move her phantoms in waving and gesticulating. They suggest that:

… these vivid sensations arise from the monitoring of reafference [efference copy] signals derived from the motor commands sent to the phantom during gesticulation. What is remarkable, however, is that the neural circuitry generating these gesticulatory movements is ‘hardwired’ and has actually survived intact for 20 years in the absence of any direct visual or kinesthetic reinforcement from her own limbs (although watching other people’s limbs might have played a role) (Ib., 1606).

These cases form a direct threat to the argument from movement. Of course, one has to be somewhat wary of these reports. It is only in a small proportion of congenital limb-deficient subjects that phantom phenomena occur at all: Weinstein and Sersen (1961) mention and incidence of 19% of phantom phenomena in this group, Melzack et al. (1997) 12% and Wilkins et al. (1998) report phantoms in 7.4% of their congenital subjects. And of these small groups it is only an extremely small proportion that can move their phantom at will. There are perhaps no more than some dozen cases documented. 
And what exactly does it mean to say that a person can move a limb that she has never had in the first place? It is very difficult to interpret these cases. What exactly is the status of a moving phantom limb? Is it imaginary or somehow perceptual, is it experienced proprioceptively?  Also there are large individual differences in the vividness of imagination. The girl who uses her phantom fingers in doing sums may rely largely on visual imagery. Gallagher et al. mention in this connection the phenomenon of ‘forgetting’: 

In some cases of phantom limb following amputation, subjects appear to be unaware that a limb is missing and, for example, try to walk on a missing leg…. The phenomenon of forgetting suggests that the missing limb continues to function as part of a motor schema. Significantly, however, although incidents of forgetting are frequently reported following amputation, no incidents of forgetting have been reported in subjects with aplasic [congenital] phantoms (Gallagher et al. 1998, 55).







If the brain has innate, hardwired motor schemas, which send efference copies when executed, there is no need of real limbs to experience agency and ownership of a body. The naked brain can be a self-aware agent and real embodiment is not necessary. Of course such a brain has evolved, and its evolution is surely dependent on previous brains which were fully embodied. Moreover, the notion of ready-made, ‘hardwired’ motor schemas or programs is losing popularity with the emergence of dynamic systems theory.​[23]​ Motor commands are monitored ‘online’ and in real time, so to speak, in the continuous interplay between efference from the motor cortex, afference from the limbs themselves, and feedback from the wider environment.  However, if there are any innate motor schemas, it is plausible that they are schemas for only such very crucial and primitive movements as hand-mouth coordination. In these schemas hand and mouth are represented, regardless of the existence of real hands.​[24]​
	There is also evidence that gesticulation is a very primitive kind of movement, both ontogenetically and phylogenetically.​[25]​ It seems that in some congenital limb-deficient subjects there are still some innate motor schemas for gesticulation. However, when it comes to counting on one’s fingers, are we really to believe that we have innate motor schemas for that? At least here it seems much more plausible that the little girl has seen other children use their fingers, and imagines using her own.
	To sum up: it is undeniable that there are topological neural representations of the body in the brain – in fact more than one.​[26]​ And, despite the criticisms from dynamic systems theory, there may very well be innate motor schemas in the brain. If those representations and motor schemas can function in the absence of real limbs and real movement, then that fact would support the claim that we need not be embodied; our brains are self-aware agents. And though for the most part real limbs and real movements are necessary, even in cases of phantoms or of deafferentation, sometimes they are not necessary. There are real cases (as opposed to thought-experimental ones) where innate neural representations and motor schemas are functioning to produce basic intentions and experiences of movement, while there never were real limbs or real movements.
	But what does the functioning of innate representations and motor schemas really amount to? When there are no real limbs, these schemas seem to work well enough. Phantom limbs are intended to move and subsequently they are experienced to make exactly the intended movement. There simply is no peripheral feedback to check against, as there are no real movements. Thus, ontogenetically, there can be some intentions without prior real movements. Phylogenetically, in the evolutionary history of these motor schemas, there have to have been real movements first. But when there are real limbs, central processes cannot function so easily. In that case real movement always precedes basic intentions, and not the other way around, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically. 
	Infants look at their moving hands for hours on end. The hands seem to move of their own accord before the infants learn to actively move them. Gradually they learn the dynamic interplay of visual and proprioceptive feedback, and so their basic intentions to move take shape. In the words of Maxine Sheets-Johnstone: 

We were apprentices of our own bodies … We learned our possibilities by moving and having moved – by catching ourselves in the kinetic act, so to speak. (Sheets-Johnstone 1999, 225).

In normal infants moving the fingers separately, for instance, has to be learned. There are no innate motor schemas to do the trick. And to most people learning to play a musical instrument does not come easily: again the controlled movement of each finger separately has to be learned. We still learn new basic intentions as adults, but not without external help, external feedback. When we have to move real limbs, the brain alone is unable to do the job. Once having mastered our basic intentions, we can usually rely on proprioception – we very seldom have to look anymore. But without proprioception we are utterly lost. I.W., a deafferented subject who has lost all proprioception from the neck downwards following an illness, has to use visual feedback in order to make voluntary movements. In the dark he is completely helpless, though not paralysed (Cole 1995; Cole and Paillard 1995).​[27]​ The central process of efference copying is hardly of any use to him. Neither can he rely on motor schemas that were previously established – whether innate or learned. His brain cannot function without the help of peripheral feedback.
	At first, just after his illness, he felt alienated from his own – moving! – body. He had to lean to move himself all over again (Gallagher and Cole 1995). He had to repossess his own body, to regain his sense of ownership. His sense of ownership is completely dependent on his sense of agency, his sense that once more he himself is the origin and controller of his own movements. But he needs constant external feedback in order to know exactly what to do, what muscles to contract with what strength. His basic intentions must, by necessity, be much more detailed than those of ordinary people.​[28]​
	Whereas normal people first need visual feedback, and afterwards still constant proprioceptive feedback, and deafferented people cannot do without visual feedback, some subjects of phantom sensations can use their phantom limbs without any external or proprioceptive feedback. They can intend to move their limbs and subsequently experience the intended movement. Why do central processes suffice for these subjects, whereas for normal people, and for subjects like I.W., they do not? Perhaps Ramachandran and Hirstein’s suggestion that they watch other people’s limbs is important here. They do have a kind of visual guidance. Or perhaps the crucial difference is that the motor commands of subjects of phantom sensations are not going anywhere, they’re not going to real limbs.​[29]​ Or, again, perhaps it is only the morphokinesis of the movement that is coded for centrally, not the topokinesis. I.W. can use gesture quite unconsciously, without looking at his hands, and the morphokinesis of his movements appear to be normal, accuracy with relation to objective space and the outside world not being necessary here (Cole et al. 1998; 2002).​[30]​ This would tally with a hypothesis independently advanced by Jürgen Streeck (1996) and Sotaro Kita (2000), that gestures are basically virtual actions.





Are we, human beings, essentially embodied and what kind of embodiment is involved here? Does embodiment require a real body? If we leave aside the ‘uninteresting’ answer (a body that is absolutely perfectly as-if it were a real one, is just as good as a real body), we can still ask whether less than the real body will do for being a self-aware agent. We are now in a position to give an empirically underpinned answer to these questions. There is evidence that less than the whole real body will do for being a self-aware agent. Congenital limb-deficient subjects sometimes experience movement of their phantoms, and sometimes even can move their phantoms intentionally. They are self-aware agents in this sense, without being completely embodied. Central brain processes are sufficient.
	However, the intended movements in question appear to be restricted to some very primitive hand-eye and gesticulatory movements. Moreover, most of the evidence points in another direction. For the vast majority of human beings, and even for subjects of phantom sensations, complete embodiment is necessary. They cannot be self-aware agents without at least having had real bodies with real limbs once.
	And even if we are forced to admit that less than the whole real body will do for embodiment, it is unclear with how much less we can get away. Missing a limb, or even four, is not the same thing as having no body at all. Does the minority report in the literature on phantom phenomena justify us in believing that we could be brains-in-a-vat? Or is all we can say that embodiment need not be complete?  
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^1	  An animat is an artificial animal or agent; it can be either robotic or virtual.
^2	  And even Putnam’s argument that we could not all be brains-in-a-vat because our internal representations must derive their meaning from a link with the real world would fail if everything in the virtual world were as if the real world existed (see Putnam 1981). 
^3	  The interaction between mother and infant is probably of primary importance for the development of self-awareness.
^4	  We also see our own bodies, but this is not usually reckoned as proprioception. Internal proprioception is deemed to be immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun; visual information is not. See Shoemaker 1968; Evans 1982; Bermúdez 1998.
^5	  Deafferented subjects can often tell where on the body they receive a stimulus, but unless they see that particular body part, they are unable to point or otherwise act towards that location. (e.g. Cole and Paillard 1995, 254).
^6	  See Ramachandran & Hirstein 1998, who call it the textbook account of phantom phenomena; see also Katz 2000. Descartes didn’t make the distinction between efferent and afferent nerves; he thought that there was only one kind of nerve. In fact there are two: afferent nerves lead from the periphery to the brain and efferent nerves lead out of the brain to the periphery. And of course most of the neural activity occurs within the brain. It is clearly the afferent nerve (and not the efferent nerve, which comes from the brain) that is stimulated in the bell-rope account. Modern theories often mention the stimulating of neuroma in the stump of the amputated limb as the cause of phantom phenomena.
^7	  Of course we no longer believe in Cartesian dualism or in res cogitans. In the modern, materialist version, however, we still might be brains-in-a-vat. But the evil scientist himself must presumably have a real body. He has to pull real strings, provide real stimulation.
^8	  Cf. Damasio 1999 for the importance of humoral signals.
^9	  Cf. Dennett 1991, 5ff.
^10	  Especially Carnap 1928.
^11	  Cf. Carnap 1936/1937. See also Fodor 1981, 1987, 1990, 1998.
^12	  Cf. Stern 1985; Johnson 1987; Bermúdez 1998; Lakoff and Johnson 1999.
^13	  See Hurley 1998 for an extended discussion on externalism, internalism and contextualism.
^14	  Cf. also Hurley 1998, 272 ff.; Sheets-Johnstone 1999.
^15	  That is to say, in the ontogeny of an individual real movements precede the occurrence of the first intentions to move. Whether conscious intentions ever precede the movements or actions they are intentions for, is quite another question. The famous experiments of Libet (1983; 1985) seem to cast doubt on this. But his outcomes are notoriously difficult to interpret. Haggard (e.g. 2005) suggests that pre-movement brain activity in the supplementary motor area plays an important role in the rise of the conscious experience of intention. I won’t go into the question whether this brain activity is to be identified with what I call the basic intention, or whether it is the cause of the conscious experience of intention, or whether conscious experience of an intention is the same “thing” as an intention or not. These are metaphysical questions that deserve discussion elsewhere.
^16	  Cf. Gallagher 2000, who develops a model to account for the fact that in schizophrenia, the senses of ownership and of agency come apart. Schizophrenics sometimes suffer from thought insertion, where they experience their thoughts as their own in the sense of ownership, yet as alien because they do not consider themselves to be the agents of these thoughts, the instigators or origins.
^17	  Cf. Wegner 2002, for an extended discussion of the conscious experience of free will. See also Haggard 2005.
^18	  See Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1998, 66-67.
^19	  Katz (2000, 79) urges to use both spinal and general anaesthesia before amputation, in order to block both somatosensory and cognitive memories and thus to prevent or diminish post-amputational phantom pain, which can otherwise be extremely persistent.
^20	  Or anaesthesia: see Dirksen et al. 2000; Paqueron et al. 2003. See also Katz and Melzack 1990.
^21	  Weinstein, Sersen and Vetter 1964; Saadah and Melzack 1994; Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1998; Wilkins et al. 1998.
^22	  E.g. Skoyles 1990.
^23	  See e.g.  Hasan and Stuart 1988; Butterworth 1993; Thelen and Smith 1994.
^24	  But not, presumably, in the absence of a real mouth!
^25	  See e.g.  Armstrong et al. 1995; McNeill 1995, 2000; Skoyles 1990.
^26	  See Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1998.
^27	  See also Meijsing 2000.
^28	  I.W. realises the importance of making gestures in communication. He claims that he had to consciously relearn them. Yet it is remarkable that now he is able to make normal gestures while telling a story without being able to see his hands, though after a while he loses track of his hands and the gestures deteriorate, first topokinetically and finally morphokinetically (Cole et al. 1998; 2002). Apparently gestures, being much more a linguistic phenomenon than an instrumental movement, depend less on visual feedback than other movements. I.W.’s linguistic abilities were in no way influenced by his illness.
^29	  I would like to thank Ton Derksen for making this suggestion.
^30	  I would like to thank an anonymous referee of my article for her/his very helpful remarks, and especially for this suggestion.
